Security and trust
What it can reach, what it will never do, and what we do not claim
You are considering giving an AI system access to your mail, your money and your customers. This page is the honest version of what that means — including the parts that are not finished.
One gate, and no way around it
Every action a specialist attempts is decided by a single function, against the class of work it belongs to. There is no second route to the outside world. Three things hold whatever you configure: account and security changes never run without a person, spending never passes a ceiling you set yourself, and a specialist can only ever be more restricted than its workspace, never less.
What a specialist may do is a list, not a prompt
Permissions are checked in code before an action runs. A specialist that was not granted the ability to send email cannot send email, whatever any prompt says. This matters most for the case that actually happens: an email or a web page containing text written to be read by an AI, telling it to do something. The instruction can be read. It cannot be obeyed past the fence.
Anything that arrives from outside is treated as hostile
Inbound mail is the most likely place someone tries this, because an attacker can put whatever they like in it and be confident something will read it. The address a workspace receives mail on contains a random token rather than the business name, so it is not guessable, and nothing that arrives decides what a specialist is allowed to do.
Least privilege, and read before write
Each connection asks for the smallest set of permissions that makes it useful, and the ability to change or send something is always separate from the ability to read. A workspace that has never unlocked outreach does not hold a permission to send mail — if we are breached, what is exposed is what was in use, not everything that was ever possible. Before you connect anything, you are shown what it will be able to do and what it will never do, in plain words.
Access tokens are encrypted, not merely restricted
A refresh token for a mailbox is, in practice, the mailbox — indefinitely and quietly, until someone notices and revokes it. So they are encrypted at rest with a key held outside the database, and the table holding them has no read policy at all. Database separation stops a query reaching the wrong rows; it does nothing about a stolen backup. Both have to be taken for either to be worth anything.
Your revenue never passes through us
If you sell through Operenda, payments settle into a Stripe account you own, in your name, and Stripe pays you out directly. We are not in the flow of funds at any point and we take no percentage. Card details go from your customer’s browser to Stripe and never touch our servers, our logs or our database — nobody here ever sees a full card number.
Mail will go out as you, or it will not go out
Sending is refused unless your domain’s SPF and DKIM records are in place and verified, and there is no override — a caller that wanted to skip the check would have to change the file that performs it. Unauthenticated mail sent on your domain would damage your reputation for months and you would have no way of knowing we had done it. Setting up and verifying a domain works, and mail you approve goes out through it under your own name.
Memory is only written from things that happened
What the business knows is built from executed actions and decisions you made — never from a specialist’s plans or prose. A store full of things an agent merely intended is worse than no store at all, because every later run then reasons from fiction.
Everything is logged, including the refusals
Every action, what the gate decided about it, and what you decided afterwards. Refused attempts are kept as carefully as successful ones — a record that only contains what worked cannot answer the question you will actually ask.
Separation between your workspace and everyone else's
Every table holding a business’s data is scoped to its workspace and enforced at the database, not only in application code. Published customer sites are served from a different domain from the app, so a problem on a page cannot reach the app’s session cookie.
Signing in, and the second step
A link emailed to you, a Google or Microsoft account, or an optional password you add from inside your own account. On top of any of those you can switch on two-step verification with an authenticator app, and an owner can require it of everybody in the business. Somebody who has your email and nothing else can then get as far as the code box and no further — not into a screen, not into the API, and not into switching the second factor off.
There is no password reset email, on purpose
A reset link sent to your inbox is exactly the single factor two-step exists to move past — it would let anybody holding your email walk in through the back. So we never send one. If you forget your password you sign in with a link as you always could, clear your second factor like any other day, and set a new password from your security screen. Recovery codes work the same way: shown once when you switch two-step on, never emailed, and never shown again.
You can see what is signed in, and end it
Every browser and device holding a sign-in for your account is listed with what it is and when it was last used, and you can end any of them — the ordinary case being a laptop left somewhere. Disconnecting an account, releasing your phone number, exporting everything and removing a colleague each ask for your code again, so that a session somebody else is holding cannot quietly take the business apart.
Four roles, and only an owner moves money
Everyone in a business is an owner, an admin, a member or a viewer. Only an owner approves spending or changes what the staff are allowed to do; a viewer can see what is happening and approve nothing. A role the system does not recognise is treated as having no rights at all, never as having all of them. You can require the authenticator code of every member.
Take everything out, or delete it for good
An owner or admin can download everything the business has told us as one file — decisions, standing rules, documents, contacts, tasks, approvals, the names of the accounts you connected and your website pages — after confirming with the authenticator code. Passwords and tokens are never in it, and uploaded files and mail are not in it yet. The owner can delete the business and everything in it, after a fresh code and typing its name: its phone and fax numbers are released, its domains and machines removed and its files deleted. Deleting is refused while a paid plan is running, so it can never leave you being charged.
Not finished
What is missing, said plainly
These are real gaps, not roadmap decoration. If one of them is a condition of you using this, it is better that you know now.
Posting and ad accounts
Your staff read, file, draft and reply to mail and read your calendars through the accounts you connect, behind your approval rules. They write posts and ad campaigns, and you publish them: posting straight to LinkedIn or Facebook waits on those platforms’ own review, and nothing here operates an ad account or holds any ad money. Where a feature has been built but not yet used by a customer, the page that describes it says so.
Signing in with Apple while hiding your address
Apple lets you keep your real email address private and hands us a forwarding address instead. That address is a perfectly good one, but it is not the address you signed up with — so if you already have an account under your own address, we cannot tell that it is you. Rather than guess, we stop and say so, and nothing is created. Sign in the way you did before, or come back through Apple and choose “Share My Email”. Starting a brand new account this way is the one thing that does not work yet: use an emailed link for that.
Setting your own retention, on a screen
Call transcripts, chat transcripts and forwarded mail each have a keep-for period, and a daily sweep deletes what has passed it. There is no screen to set it on yet, so today it is a request to us rather than a setting. Your business’s own records — tasks, documents, contacts, decisions and the audit trail — are kept while the account is open, by design. What the telephone keeps is the exception: that one you can set yourself, on your phone line.
Where it is
Where your data lives, and who else can see it
Four questions people ask and most products answer with a paragraph about taking security seriously. Here are the answers.
Everything this product knows about your business — the database and the files you upload — is in us-east-1 (Northern Virginia, United States).
Companies we chose
Your data reaches these because of a decision we made.
Supabase
us-east-1 (Northern Virginia, United States)The database and the files you upload. Everything this product knows about your business is here.
Vercel
United StatesRuns the application, and the machine with a browser on it that your staff use for websites with no other way in.
Anthropic
United StatesThe models your staff think with. What a specialist reads to do a piece of work is sent here and the answer comes back.
Duffel
United Kingdom (company); storage location not publishedFinds flights for a trip your staff are planning: only the airports, dates, cabin and number of travellers are sent — no names.
Google (Gemini Omni)
United StatesMakes a short video from the description your staff write, when you ask for one. Only that description is sent; the clip comes back and is kept with your documents. Google keeps the description and the clip for a time under its own terms.
OpenAI
United StatesDraws the artwork for your website from a description of your business, and turns a voice note you send on WhatsApp into words. The recording is not kept by us — only the words become your message.
Resend
United StatesSends mail your staff write, and receives mail sent to your staff's own addresses.
Twilio
United StatesYour phone number and your text messages.
Telnyx
United StatesYour fax number. A fax you send goes to Telnyx as the document itself and is never published at a link; a fax you receive is fetched from Telnyx and kept with your documents.
Retell
United StatesThe voice on the telephone. What it keeps of a call is yours to set — see the phone line settings.
Stripe
United StatesTakes your subscription payment. We never see a card number.
Text messages
United StatesTwilio again, for the number your staff answer and the texts they send you.
LoopMessage
United StatesCarries the iMessages you send your staff and their answers, once iMessage is switched on.
Accounts you connected
Your data is already in these. What we do is read them with permission you granted and can take back at any time, from the account itself or from your connections screen. We do not know, and do not claim to know, which country your own provider keeps them in.
Your mailbox provider
Google or Microsoft, or any mailbox that speaks IMAP. Your staff read and file mail in the account you connected.
Your calendar
Google, Microsoft, iCloud or any CalDAV calendar. Your staff read it and put things in it.
Your contacts
The address book you connected, read so a caller is not treated as a stranger.
Your task list
Google Tasks, Microsoft To Do or Asana, kept in step with the work your staff raise. In Asana only the tasks assigned to you are read.
Your file storage
Google Drive, OneDrive, Dropbox, Evernote or Notion. Read where your staff need a document, and written to only when you ask.
Your Zoom account
Used only to make a Zoom meeting for a booking of a type you set to Zoom (and a dial-in for a phone booking), move it when the booking moves, and delete it when it is cancelled. It never touches a meeting it did not make, and never joins or records one.
Apps you connect under More apps
Notion, Linear, Jira, HubSpot and the rest, through each vendor's own server. Read when your staff need them; changed only after you approve each change; nothing is ever deleted and no money is moved.
Your automations
Zapier, Make, n8n or whatever you added. Only what your staff send them, after you approve it — a summary and the facts you would expect that automation to receive.
Your Shopify store
Orders, products and stock, read when your staff need them and summarised — never stored, never changed. No customer names, emails or addresses are asked for.
Your accounting
QuickBooks, read so figures come from your books rather than from somebody's memory.
Your meeting recorder
Plaud or Granola, read so a meeting your staff were not in is still something they know about.
Your social accounts
LinkedIn and Meta, and a scheduler of your own — Buffer or Publer — using your own key, posted to only with your approval.
Your ad accounts
Meta and Google. Campaigns are drafted and costed; nothing is launched from here yet.
Your lead sources
Hunter or Apollo, searched with your own key when a specialist is looking for somebody to approach.
Your website
Hosted here, on your Operenda address.
What is encrypted, and what is not
Four different things with four different answers. Each one says what it does not cover, because a list of protections with the gaps on another page is a list designed to mislead.
Passwords, keys and access tokens — a site login you save, a mailbox connection, a social account
Encrypted by this application with AES-256-GCM before it is written down, using a key kept in the running application's environment and not in the database. AES-256-GCM is authenticated, so a tampered value is detected rather than quietly decrypted into something else. Every value records which key sealed it, so the key can be changed without anybody reconnecting anything.
What it does not cover: Nothing stops you giving us a password you should not have given anybody. Save an account with the least access that does the job, and change it at the site if you ever want it genuinely gone.
Everything else we hold for you — your messages to your staff, documents, call transcripts, contacts, invoices, the record of what your staff did
Stored in ordinary database columns, on disks encrypted by the platform with AES-256, which is on by default and cannot be switched off. Each business's rows are separated by row-level security, so one customer's query cannot reach another's data.
What it does not cover: This is not end-to-end encrypted to us, and we will not pretend otherwise: your staff have to read your mail to file it and your documents to answer from them, so the values are readable by the application and by anyone who legitimately holds its credentials. Encryption at rest protects against a stolen disk or a leaked backup. It does not make your data private from us.
Everything travelling between you, us, and the services you connected
HTTPS with TLS, for the app, the API, and every call we make to a provider on your behalf. The database refuses an unencrypted connection outright — including a direct one from a backup tool or an administrator's laptop, which is the leg most products leave open.
What it does not cover: The leg between you and the service you connected is theirs, not ours. A mailbox provider's own security is the mailbox provider's, and connecting an account does not improve or worsen it.
The number you text or WhatsApp your staff on
One number, shared by every business using the product — which is the cheap way and also the ordinary way, the same as a bank's support line. What makes a message yours is not the number you sent it to: it is that the handset was proved. You ask the app for a code, text it back from the phone, and that handset is linked. The code proves the person at the keyboard holds the phone, which is the one thing a phone number cannot fake, and a verified handset is evidence only about the person who proved it — the database refuses it being claimed by anybody else. If your handset reaches more than one of your businesses, your staff ask which one and hold the instruction until you say.
What it does not cover: A text message is not encrypted end to end, and a number you no longer control is a number somebody else will one day have. Unlink a handset when you stop using it. Your phone line is the opposite arrangement — that number is bought for your business and nobody else answers it.
What is said on the telephone
You choose what your telephony provider keeps of a call — the recording and the words, the words with personal details removed, or nothing but who rang and for how long — and how many days before it is deleted. Separately, whether we keep our own copy of the words.
What it does not cover: A telephone call crosses the public telephone network, which nobody encrypts end to end. Whatever is said on a call is said on a phone line.
Treat this the way you treat a work email account: it is business infrastructure, not a private diary. Your staff cannot do the work without reading what you give them, so anything you would not put in a work email does not belong in here either. Passwords and card details are the exception, and they have their own route — never type one into the conversation.
What we have not got
- Key rotation exists and has not yet been done in production. The key can be changed without anybody reconnecting anything — old rows stay readable while they are re-sealed with the new key in the background — but until it has been rotated for real, that is a tested capability rather than a habit.
- No customer-managed keys. The encryption key is ours, in our environment. A business that needs to hold its own key cannot do that here.
- No end-to-end encrypted mode. There is no setting that makes your records unreadable to us while your staff still work on them, and anyone offering you both is selling you one of them.
- No security certification. There is no SOC 2 report and no ISO 27001 to point you at. Nothing on this site implies otherwise, and anything that changes appears here as a date and a document rather than a badge.
A password you save for a website
The one piece of this product that holds something which is not ours. “Encrypted vault, we never see it” is what every product says, so here is the same claim in specifics you can check.
- Where does it go when I type it?
- Straight into an encrypted store, from the page you typed it on. It is encrypted with AES-256-GCM before it is written down.
- Where is the key?
- Not in the same place as the password. The key lives in the running application's environment, not in the database, so a copy of the database is not a list of passwords — somebody would have to take both to have either.
- What stops it being typed into the wrong site?
- It is bound to one host. Before it is filled into a page, we check the browser is actually on that exact host — not a subdomain of it, not a lookalike. A convincing copy of your supplier's sign-in page gets nothing.
- Does the AI see it?
- No, and not as a courtesy. A specialist asks to sign in; the request it makes carries no username and no password, and anything it tries to attach is stripped. The value is put into the page by the application after the host check.
- Can anyone read it back out?
- There is no screen and no endpoint that returns a saved password — not for you, not for us, not for support. If you forget one, change it at the site and save it again.
- Where is it kept, and in which country?
- In the database named above, in us-east-1 (Northern Virginia, United States).
- How do I get rid of it?
- Remove it in Settings, or tell your staff to forget it. The password is deleted rather than flagged, and there is no undo.
Questions we will answer
Every one of these is answered on this page. We mention it because they are the questions a careful buyer asks before handing over a mailbox, and because “that is under the hood” is a common answer to all four.
- Which models does it run on, and who makes them?
- Which country is my data in, and who holds it?
- Who else can see it — the full list, not the headline?
- Is my data used to train anything?
What does not happen to it
- Your data does not train anybody's model. We do not train on it, and the model provider does not train on what comes through their interface.
- We do not sell it, and we do not share it with anybody not on the list above.
- No specialist sees a password you saved. It is filled into a page by us, and only on the site you saved it for.
- A verification code is never read out on a call, to anybody, including somebody who says they are from your bank or from us.
- Nothing publishes, sends, spends or signs in as you without the approval you set — and that is a boundary in the code, not a default you can be talked out of.
What we do not claim
We hold no security certification. There is no SOC 2 report, no ISO 27001, and no third-party penetration test to point you at. If a page anywhere on this site implied otherwise it would be a lie, so none of them do. When any of that changes it will appear here with a date and a document, not as a badge.
Coming soonAn independent review is intended before there is anything to certify.
The full detail of what is accessed, why, how long it is kept and what is never done with it is in the privacy notice, and the agreement itself is in the terms.